US Institute: UN peace plan in Yemen 'extremely disastrous'
English - Tuesday 27 July 2021 الساعة 04:24 pm
NewsYemen, special translation:
The US "Middle East" Institute hosted international experts in a webinar entitled "Can a New UN Envoy Bring Peace to Yemen?"
The first expert was Peter Salisbury, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Corporation, where he pointed out that the problem with the United Nations peace plan lies in the disconnect between its vision of its mission, i.e. a model of conflict resolution, in which a power-sharing agreement is reached between the government and a rebel group to re-establish the legitimate state, And the basic reality in which the actors spread in governance and the collapse of the power of governance for one of these two main parties.
Salisbury says it's good for everyone to admit that this kind of deal "isn't going to happen", as there is no catalytic structure to encourage it.
Moreover, if such a deal were to occur, it could be "extremely disastrous", as Salisbury sees it, and almost certainly would simply lead to a new round of conflict.
Salisbury argues that the establishment of a "unity government" between Hadi and the Houthis now would include the legitimate government under the leadership of the Houthis, who control the most effective state institutions and put a formidable security structure on top of them. It is deeply problematic in itself, in fact, to give an international character to the Houthi dictatorship, but it will not "success" in the narrow sense.
Salisbury says the results will be predictable: we will see people at the local level resist, and that will turn into another civil war."
Salisbury explains that the UN needs to change its approach to try to engage with a wider circle of Yemenis, such as women's groups and other pro-peace organizations, and needs to develop a "vision of a political process... that deals with the facts, rather than the rush to achieve peace" that defines Simply as a cease-fire the way it was happening, because continuing on its current trajectory is to create an environment that in many ways represents the “perfect excuse” for “the Houthis to continue their military aggression, leaving Hadi’s camp only on the defensive.”
Salisbury believes that the thing the UN operation has been most damaging to is: by stabilizing the political process on two sides, it has decoupled this process from conditions on the ground. What is required is to integrate this political track with the military situation inside the country, that is, to expand the circle of people at the UN table to include those who have actual and legitimate power in Yemen, and this will shift the incentive structure towards the creation of political alliances.
Regarding this, Salisbury explains, the problem at the moment is Hadi's problem in particular, and ironically, there is something in his favour, which is that his seat at the United Nations table is secured. This means that Hadi has no incentive to begin building a coalition in order to maintain his seat, paradoxically weakening his position.
Salisbury adds that if the Yemeni political entities that joined the Houthis for opportunistic reasons are convinced that their interests - whether values, power or patronage - align better with Hadi's, this may prompt them to change direction. And so the incentive structures must change to get there.
For her part, Nadwa Al-Dosari, a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, said: "The United Nations should not be relied on to solve Yemen's problems (...) as it struggles with "huge powers", local and regional, "outside the scope of the United Nations' capacity."
However, Al-Dosari notes, the UN's approach to the peace process in Yemen has created specific problems, by "focusing too much on an elite political settlement" between the Hadi government and the Iran-backed Houthis.
This approach has been "detached from reality" as it has developed over the past seven years and more than the war.
Al-Dosari sees one of the problems in the UN-led peace process as a "lack of inclusiveness". The other problem is influence: Al-Dosari notes that the United Nations has put pressure on the legitimate government in Yemen and its supporters in the Arab coalition, but they have not applied any effective pressure on Iran or its Houthi proxy.
Ultimately, this means that the UN operation is “doing more harm than good,” Al-Dosari argues, because it does not take into account military realities on the ground.
The classic example of the UN's unrealism on Yemen - and indeed the turning point in the war - was the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, according to which, as Al-Dosari explains, the Arab coalition and joint forces were forced to abandon an offensive that would have led to the capture of the port city of Hodeidah. of the Houthis, which would have seriously weakened them and provided more favorable conditions for peace. Instead, the UN intervention in Hodeidah has allowed the Houthis to reposition their forces, make significant gains east of Sanaa, and in recent months launch a large-scale offensive against Marib, the last stronghold of the Hadi government.
“Therefore, inadvertently, the UN peace process aided the Houthis militarily,” says Al-Dosari. Despite the warnings of many Yemenis, the United Nations did not listen. It is also noteworthy that the United Nations hardly protested the recent Houthi attack on Marib, let alone taken effective action to stop it.
Al-Dosari stated that the Houthis have been clear about what they want: they refuse to recognize Hadi's government, and consider themselves the only legitimate authority in Yemen; They define their war as jihad, and their opponent is Saudi Arabia, and their intention is to expel the Saudis and rule all of Yemen.
In short, “diplomacy without influence does not work,” Al-Dosari argues, and no one has—or is willing to gain—any influence over the Houthis. As such, what the UN can do is "very limited" and it is "important that we do not have high expectations about the next UN envoy or the UN peace process".
Al-Dosari says that the key factors required for peace are better organization of the anti-Houthi coalition, and despite the lack of desire for this, "perfect" force would be used to weaken the Houthis.
Al-Dosari adds that the Houthi attack on the tribal system may end up being one of the most important aspects of this war. It removes a major intermediary limiting state power - even under Saleh, the government had to work with the tribes, and simply could not control them. If the tribal system collapses, it will not only bring despotism but chaos. This may mean that there are no building blocks for restoring order, even if the Houthis can be removed.
When asked how many parties should be included in the peace talks - should it be four (Hadi, the Houthis, the Southern Transitional Council and Tariq Saleh) instead of only the two current parties (Hadi and the Houthis), or should all the mixed parties in the country get a seat?, she says Al-Dosari said that it is difficult to determine the number of seats, especially since some non-hostile parties can be included under the banner of the Hadi government. But the UN needs to engage more actors in Yemen, even if not all, to give itself a better sense of the reality of the land and thus how to move towards peace: who are the players, who are the spoilers, how can they be spoilers, what are they up to Willingness to do or accept it, etc.
