20 years of preparation and implementation.. the Houthi strategy to control al-Bayda
English - Thursday 28 October 2021 الساعة 09:41 am
Al-Bayda, NewsYemen, Special:
The Houthi movement realized the strategic importance of controlling al-Bayda governorate from an early age, an importance that was demonstrated by the military battles that Yemen witnessed, the past two months, as an inevitable step to think of militarily entering the neighboring southern and eastern governorates as the first line of defense, as the neighboring districts of Marib and Shabwa continued to fall.
At the beginning of the new millennium, the Houthis took a parallel and long-term political and intelligence strategy in various social and religious aspects to control militarily over Al-Bayda, which is described as the republican governorate historically hostile to the Imamate. On high-ranking intelligence systems, it paid off militarily after another seven years of battles, starting in October 2015, albeit at a heavy price, as thousands of its members and leaders were killed or wounded.
The most prominent plans of the Houthis to bring down Al-Bayda Governorate can be summarized in the following points:
1- The Hashemite provoke some families in the governorate, such as Al-Habsi, Al-Aydros, Riam and Al-Wareth in the Radaa area, to join their youth to Hussain Al-Houthi, the founder of the movement in the Saada governorate, to study under him and push them later to participate - secretly - in the battles of the rebellion against the state or what was known as the Six Wars. Where members of those families died while fighting in the ranks of the Houthis, and the numbers increased since the 2011 crisis and openly, and they became the mainstay of Houthi intervention in the governorate and managing its affairs.
2- Working with terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda provided Al-Bayda Governorate to the Houthi militia on a platter of great services that it did not dream of and gave it the justification it needed and the political and media cover needed to come to this governorate as loyal conquerors. Al-Qaeda was burning the homes of those affiliated with the group in the city of Radaa and forcing its residents to flee to the neighboring province of Dhamar.
The Houthi media, along with some of the supportive party media, unconsciously relied on these violations to promote that what happened was a systematic process of ethnic displacement targeting the Hashemite families in Al-Bayda. The presence of the extremist organization in Al-Bayda to incite public opinion and gain the sympathy of society.
3- The movement sought to legitimize the control of al-Bayda and to create a political cover for the military move, and it had that on September 21, 2014, that is, on the first day of its storming of Sana’a by signing the Peace and Partnership Agreement with the Yemeni government, political parties and President Hadi as well, which insisted that the eighth item of its security annex include: A text requiring the government to support the Houthis in the invasion of al-Bayda, or what it called (the battles to eradicate terrorist organizations from al-Bayda governorate).
The militia waited only days to send regiments of its qualitative battalions to al-Bayda, and the importance of that agreement (the legitimate cover) became apparent when it was unable for weeks to storm the tribal areas in the district of Ould Rabie and al-Qurayshih, had it not been for the artillery and missile support it received from the army brigades in the Dhamar governorate, which came to build The Peace and Partnership Agreement is binding on its attribution.
4- The movement was able to attract a number of al-Bayda’s sheikhs, thus achieving a penetration into the social system of the cohesive tribe component in this tribal-style governorate. It used these sheikhs on the military side, establishing strongholds for them, receiving stations, protecting their supervisors and leaders, and starting points and expanding throughout the governorate. Sheikh Saleh bin Saleh al-Wahbi is considered And Sheikh Saif al-Qibli most prominent of them.
It also took advantage of the chaos that accompanied the 2011 protests and the events and crises that followed to attract young men from ancient sheikhdom families who knew their political ambitions, and was able to make a breakthrough in the family of Al-Dhahab - the sheikhs of the Qaifa tribe - who were a number of them at the time leaders in Al-Qaeda, by winning Sheikh Saif Ahmed Gold through intermarriage and his marriage to the daughter of a first-class leader, Dhaif Allah Rassam, who is in charge of tribal affairs in the group, which had a clear impact on the Houthis storming the first tribal areas in al-Bayda, where gold was a sword at the head of the military campaign.
5- Later, with the launch of the Houthi attacks and their incursion, the pre-prepared strategy and its servants did not stop in one way or another, the betrayal that the tribes found from the national army controlled by the Islah party, starting from Qaifa and ending with the Hamiqan family through the Awad family. These tribes and the popular resistance were left facing their fate alone, although their military support - with the possibility of that - was enough to tip their scales and strengthen their position in the face of the militia.
The practices and actions of the reformist leaders and the corruption operations that accompanied the establishment of the Al-Bayda axis and the military brigades on partisan bases unrelated to the interest of the country, led to the dismantling of the ranks of the anti-Houthi fighters in the governorate, which resulted in the luring of military and tribal leaders to the side of the Houthis or their death, and the fall of areas and directorates that had remained steadfast for years.
