Al-Sufi: How will the leadership council's announcement affect the front lines
English - Friday 08 April 2022 الساعة 01:44 pm
The announcement says that the council's task is to negotiate with the Houthis.
The assumption is based on the fact that Oman will lead al-Houthi to content themselves with what is under their hand and enter into peace.
In the south, the south had half of the highest authority along with half the government, and this might be an important key to positioning the south if the north returned with the Houthis' peace, half by half, reaching federalism.
But how will the north arrange its affairs between the Houthis and the members who currently represent the north? How much will al-Houthi accept his representation in the council?
And how will that be balanced in the south?
This is if all our statements about the nature of Al-Houthi are wrong, and Al-Houthi appears as a national political group.
But if peace is not achieved, and al-Houthi fought another battle towards Marib or elsewhere, how will the Leadership Council face the duties of the fronts?
This is a question that calls for military concern, but let us postpone the concern for a while.
Everyone is now competing with each other to celebrate, and everyone considers decisions as his gain.
Today's dawn presidential decisions, which ended Riyadh's consultations before they ended, have important positives, but they are positives of necessity. The formation of a leadership council is a confirmation of the deterioration of the centrality of the position of the President of the Constitutional Republic of Yemen, as a result of Hadi's refusal to take this step since 2014, the end of his term specified in the Gulf initiative.
We had a strong presidency of reference, which ended with the 2011 revolution, followed by a president without a reference, and today we have a leadership council appointed by a president who has expired and outside the country, and it is a council that, had it not been for the southern presence, would have been more like the leadership council of the Syrian revolution.
The assembly is another step away from the constitution, and from all the references that Hadi used to say he adhered to. This is a natural result, because the Republic of Yemen has become weaker than it was, but this weakness was not caused by the council, but rather as a result of its previous performance. As for the formation of the council, it is a rule of necessity in order not to make matters worse.
This is the realism that must be adhered to instead of flashy slogans that no longer have any value on the ground in the post-revolutionary state of 2011 and the fall of the Republic of Yemen in 2014 under the blows of the Houthi state that completely contradicts the unity, the republic and the national state.
There is another positive. The council, despite the weak legitimacy of the state it governs in theory, will give the negotiations with Al-Houthi strength in the face of the international community. Legitimacy in its previous form was in the most weak state, a weakness that caused the Houthis to swell by virtue of their control over the land and their organizational unity. Today, the Leadership Council will constitute a great force at the negotiating table as a representative of all spectrums of opponents who stand against the Houthis.
Another point remained, which was that the council moved the forces of the giants, whose opponents were threatening them with accusations of religious tendencies, to the highest level of legitimacy, so its leader became a member of the leadership council.