Recent terrorist operations in Yemen.. Position assessment
English - Saturday 29 July 2023 الساعة 06:17 pm
NewsYemen, Written by: Abdulsattar Saif Al-Shamiri
Given the nature of al-Qaeda's work historically, in Yemen and elsewhere, we find that it depends on a tactically calculated retreat and regrouping of forces before reappearing. Even when the organization was losing its incubator, it continued to gain new recruits and reposition in safe havens.
In Yemen specifically and in the liberated areas, there are two essential points that have helped al-Qaeda in the last eight years to survive, expand and be able to launch attacks, the latest of which was the terrorist acts in Shabwa and Abyan and the assassination of Moayad Hamidi, the official of the World Food Agency, who was assassinated in the city of Turbah. These two points are:
First: The involvement of al-Qaeda elements in the arms trade with others affiliated with al-Houthi, other religious groups, tribal sheikhs, influential figures, former and new smugglers.
Second: The state of informational and logistical cooperation with other religious groups, most notably the Houthis, and some of them supported.
The management of Ibn Saif al-Adl, who moved to Yemen years ago to manage al-Qaeda’s financial affairs, commissioned by his father, who now leads al-Qaeda in the world from his headquarters at Khorasan base in Iran, gave a new variable in al-Qaeda’s vision and priorities, which became according to the new theory of al-Qaeda, which leaked into the corridors of intelligence and centers. Research, and it does or says text "focusing on the near enemy, not the far," which is a principle imposed by Saif al-Adl with Iranian engineering that makes the army, security, and legitimacy in Yemen the closest enemy, not America and Israel, or what was in the previous declared priorities.
This aims to shuffle the cards in the areas liberated by al-Qaeda, since al-Houthi was expelled from them, and gives an impression of the stability of the al-Houthi areas and the absurdity of the areas of legitimacy.
The new architecture of al-Qaeda in Yemen led by Saif al-Adl and his son, in addition to the information provided by the eavesdropping devices on Iranian ships at sea near the coasts of Aden, Hodeidah, Saleef, and others. This information and the flow of money gave al-Qaeda a new spirit and helped it survive despite all the blows it received in the south, Shabwa and Abyan. Specifically, where the forces fought the largest battles in history with al-Qaeda in camps that took the mountains and the difficult mountainous nature as a safe haven.
It is true that the state of instability in the liberated areas and the security chaos constituted an additional tributary, but the variable of Iranian engineering, information, and the provision of drones to Al-Qaeda moves Al-Qaeda to a new historical phase that observers may realize, but after a while, and it is a very important matter that deserves study and tracking.
It goes without saying that Al Qaeda, over the course of three decades and until this day, has been able to create for itself tools like those of the state and a strong military structure that can adapt to the surrounding reality, and this has helped it with its willingness to discover everything new and take advantage of technology and has produced a new generation skilled in dealing with The means of communication and employing it for the benefit of its operations.
The organization was not just a means of communication or a system of arming and control. This generation of al-Qaeda was able to continue the process of learning from the basics of the old generation of al-Qaeda sheikhs and ideologues, while imbuing the learning process with the development that the world is enjoying.
The conclusion of the situation can be estimated as follows:
It is clear that al-Qaeda in Yemen has lost many of its strongholds, incubators, and main camps, but it has not lost its effectiveness and ability to fight.
The retreat of al-Qaeda and the loss of an area of its geography should not be seen as an indication of its loss of the ability to initiate, and it is an apparent retreat.
The organization has replaced everything that was lost with new elements of strength, which is the amount of information that facilitates the accuracy and time of implementing the objectives, as well as the type and number of weapons, in addition to the flow of money and logistical support.
Behind this replacement is an Iranian vision to shuffle the cards in the south and strike Taiz and Marib in the north, without any Houthi effort.
Utilitarian spaces and the exchange of interests between religious groups constitute strength for the organization and provide it with a longer life if we take into account the emphasis that there is a wide pragmatic field adopted by al-Qaeda to deal with external parties, including Iran and others, to play the role of proxy wars.
An assessment of the situation can be based on current political considerations and conditions, the change in the balance of power, the change of arms, and the flow of arms, by emphasizing that Al Qaeda has become a new player in all military equations and in the shadows of political battles as well. Although it seems that the organization is outside the political discourse, its shadow and effects to strengthen some forces and change the balance of power are clear and evident.
The organization appears suddenly, to strengthen a force, through its strikes on some parties within the components of legitimacy, and this confirms that it is a main party in the current conflict and not just a terrorist group that can be eliminated easily and with a fatal blow.
Based on this hypothesis, in assessing the situation, the legitimacy and behind it the Arab coalition must adopt a new strategy to confront the organization, and get out of the naive dealings, which hold that this is a terrorist organization that can be confronted with intermittent operations sometimes, or whenever it carries out an operation.
The matter has become more dangerous than before, as the matter of the organization has become more complex, its external link more clear, and its effectiveness more deadly.
