Iran does not stop the fighting: Yemen is an example
English - Thursday 31 August 2023 الساعة 04:16 pm
NewsYemen, written by/Tony Issa:
Since the Saudis and Iranians concluded their historic agreement in Beijing, analysts have been focusing on tracking the security and political paths in areas of Iranian influence in the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon, seeking to answer the following question: What strategy will Tehran adopt in the next phase of the conflict? Is it the “zero problems” strategy that Saudi Arabia is working to implement?
Despite Omani mediation and attempts at political communication between the Houthis and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, observers were surprised by a programmed Houthi military escalation. The Houthis launched an attack on the positions of the Transitional Council in the southern Lahj Governorate last Sunday, leaving about 30 dead and wounded among the army. Over the past few weeks, Houthi attacks have continued, including those targeting areas adjacent to the border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
This escalation calls for many questions:
1- What path will the war in Yemen take, after the Beijing agreement?
2- What is the future of Yemen as a unified and independent political entity?
3- What is the strategy adopted by Iran in its endeavor to extend its widest sphere of influence in the Middle East and the Arab and Islamic worlds, starting with Yemen?
4- How will the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and their Gulf allies deal with the Houthi escalation in Yemen, as it is the greatest challenge to the security of the Arab Gulf?
It is clear that the eight-year war in Yemen established facts that have become difficult to undo, most notably the Houthis’ militarily “ganizationalization” and their control over the capital, Sana’a, where the centers of government are, and over many extremely important economic facilities. They were also able to impose themselves as partners capable of addressing the main Gulf powers peer to peer.
What the Houthis want today, from any settlement being arranged, is Gulf, Arab and international recognition of them, as the first decision makers in the future of Yemen. At the same time, they refuse to discuss their weapons in any way at any dialogue table.
In short, the Houthis want to assimilate the state by entering it, so that it becomes entirely under their control. At that time, Yemen, located in the heart of the Arabian Gulf, will be one of the Arab countries that orbit Tehran, that is, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This is a precious card that Tehran does not seem willing to give up, even if it concludes an agreement to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, in practice, the Houthis have not stopped their fighting until today, but they have changed their tactics. There is a belief that they will pay attention in the next stage to the most important areas militarily and economically in Yemen, especially the ports and oil wells, in an effort to fortify themselves with the financial capabilities needed by the areas under their influence.
Some analysts say that Iran, despite its agreement with Saudi Arabia, provides the necessary cover for its Yemeni allies in order to maintain their power and consolidate their influence in the future of Yemen and the Gulf. Therefore, she does not intervene, asking them to remain calm. On the contrary, it wants them to take advantage of the opportunity to bite off as many gains as possible before any possible settlement.
There are those who believe that Iran is not really interested in achieving a political settlement in Yemen at the present time, and that it prefers to give its Yemeni allies ample time to improve their negotiating positions to the maximum extent, so that the settlement, if its conditions mature, will come as a translation of their military victory.
In the assessment of some, Iran has sufficient time to achieve its goal, while Saudi Arabia is in a hurry to end the Yemeni file as quickly as possible, so that it can launch its ambitious development project, “Vision 2030,” in a climate of military and political stability.
Most likely, this Houthi and Iranian behavior does not provoke the United States, nor does it push it to take any deterrent stance. Washington may also find an opportunity to invest in this conflict. The Gulf allies, under the influence of anxiety from the strikes of the Houthis and Iran, will always find themselves forced to request American support, with the aim of obtaining political protection, and paying billions of oil for the most advanced weapons.
Iran's behavior in Yemen appears to be part of its strategy in dealing with the four Arab countries in which Tehran has influence, namely Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In all of these entities, one scene appears: faltering political settlements, collapsing institutions, and Tehran's allies mobilizing to consolidate their influence within it. It is clear that they are all witnessing some types of military or security truces, but there is no room for real settlements and state building.
For decades, it has been widely said that Lebanon's fate is similar to Iraq's. If one country is stable, the other is also stable, and vice versa. Today, Yemen can be introduced as a model for Iraq and Lebanon, as well as Syria, with some differences in the nature of the conflict. Thus, the four entities will remain spinning amidst the hurricanes of the Middle East.
* Quoted from the Lebanese Republic.
